A VIEW OF THE PAROL-EVIDENCE RULE.-.
PART III.

§

12. Same: Rule againstdisturing a ClarMeaning. It

is often said that where a word or a phrase bears a single clear
meaning or application, no showing will be alloWed that the
party or parties actually used it in a different sense; and that
therefore no evidence of usage or circumstances tending to
prove such a sense will be considered. This limitation finds
expression in varying forms; sometimes, for example, it is said
that outside circumstances may be considered to identify and
apply the description, and if a single object is found which
exactly fits the description, then that object alone will be
taken as designated by the terms of the document; sometimes it is said that where no ambiguity exists, no facts showing a peculiar intent will be considered. These varying
phrasings, however, seem to rest on the same general notion,
that, where the literal terms of the document have a clear and
precise significance according to general standards, then the
process of appealing to the individual standard of party or
parties making the document, and of showing the application
or sense of the words to have been used by them peculiarly
and differently from the ordinary or apparent one, will be prohibited. This attitude may be partly accounted for historically,
as a survival of an early scholastic and narrow view of the limits
of interpretation,' partly (in the American cases) by a misapplication of the preceding exclusionary'rule about declarations
of intention to the whole field of interpretative data.2 But it
will be seen that it can have no justification, in principle. The
object of interpretation, as already explained, is to discover and
enforce the terms of the document in the sense employed by the
party (if one only) or parties (if two or more); and it cannot mat-

' This history is fully expounded by Professor Thayer, Preliminary
Treatise, 41o, 445.
2
Usually by treating that rule as equivalent to the exclusion of all
"parol evidence" unless an " a m biguity " existed.
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ter what other persons might have understood by the words,
if the party himself has not used them in that significance. It
may be difficult, in a giren instance, to believe that the party
did use them in a peculiar and (to others) unnatural sense, and
the evidence may be in a given case insufficient to convince
that he did; but if it can be shown beyond doubt that he did,
then there is no legal reason why his sense and application of
the words shauld not be enforced and why the data that show
it should not be considered. "No amount of evidence," said
Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls, in a well-known witticism, "would convince him that black was white; 1 but it is
one thing not to be convinced by the evidence in a given case,
and a very different thing not to listen to evidence at all or
not to accept the consequences if the evidence does convince.
The truth is that this rule about not disturbing a clear meaning, so far as it should have any recognition, ought to be (in
the epigrammatic phrase of Lord Justice Bowen 2) "not so
much a canon of construction as a counsel of caution."
To-day this supposed rule has an anomalous standing.
On the one hand, we find it frequently mentioned and occasionally enforced; on the other hand, we find rulings which
clearly demonstrate that it has no necessary part and no
established status in the law. (x) In the case of wills, it has
been repudiated in several rulings which go to the extreme in
illustrating the true process of interpretation, namely, that of
finding and enforcing the sense used by the testator, no matter
what the sense obtaining among other persons; the possible
result of this process is typified in Chief Justice Doe's summing
up,' that "a person known to the testator as A. B., and to all
others as C. D., may take a legacy given to A. B. ; "' a freIMitchell v. Henry, 24Sol.Journ. 690; x5 Ch. D. x8r; the question

wa whether the term "white selvage" could be shown by trade usage
to be applicable to an article which to ordinary observers was dark gray
or black.

' Re Jodrell, 44 Ch.D. 59o.

sTilton v. Amer. Bible Soc'y, 6o N. H. 377.
' Some of the cases are as follows: Ryall v. Hannam, zo Beav. 536
("to Elizabeth Abbott, a natural daughter of E. A., of the parish of G.,
single woman, and who formerly lived in my service ;" on data too
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quent field for the process is in enforcing the testator's individual usage of terms which ordinarily have a fixed legal
significance of a different purport.' On the other hand, there
are many rulings in which the apparent or natural sense has
been enforced, and no showing of the testator's individual and
abnormal usage has been allowed.2 (24 In the case of contracts
numerous to note here, this description was held to signify John, the
natural son of E. A., then married); Parsons v. Parsons, I Ves. Jr. 266
(to his "brother Edward Parsons;" taken to apply to Samuel P., whom
the testator had habitually called Edward; though there was a deceased
brother Edward); Beaumont v. Fell, 2 P. Wins. 141 (to "Catharine
Earnley ;" interpreted to apply to one Gertrude Yardley); Blundell v.
Gladstone, 11 Sim. 467, on appeal in i Phillips, 279 (particularly thL
opinion of Patteson, J.); Powell v. Biddle, 2 Dall. 7o (to "Samuel P.,
son of S. P., of the city of Philadelphia, carpenter ;
S. P. had sons
William and Samuel; the legacy was given to William, on the strength
of the testator's usage as to the name) ; Smith v. Kimball, 62 N. H. 6o6
(to "Meredith Institution;" construed on the facts as applicable to the
Kimball Union Academy of Meriden); Ross I. Kiger, 42 W. Va. 4o2
(similar to the preceding case).
I Doe v. Beynon, 12 A. & E. 431 (to "her three daughters;" application to illegitimate daughter, allowed to be evidence) x Grant v. Grant,
L. R. s C. P. 727, per Blackburn, J. ("1my nephewtj. G.;" there were
two such nephews, sons respectively of the testator's brother and of his
wife's brother; the term was held applicable, by the testator's usage, to
the latter); Re Homer, 37 C. H. D. 695 (to "my sister C., the wife of
T. H.," and on her death, "among her children;" H. was only cohabiting with C., and the testator knew this; but his words were interpreted
to signify C.'s illegitimate children); Re Jodrell, 44 Ch. D. Sgo (to
"relatives ;" held to apply to "all those the testator had before treated
as relatives," even including persons related through illegitimate children) ; Robb's Estate, 37S. C. 19, 28, 39 (to "such persons as shall be
entitled under the law;" the law did not recognize persons related
through illegitimacy; but the testator's usage as applying the terms to
such persons was admitted.
2 Stringer v. Gardiner, 4 DeG. & J. 468 ("my.said niece , S.;" a
niece E. S. had died before the date of the will; a granddaughter of this
niece, also named E. S., was living; the description was applied to the
former, by the present rule) ; Dorin v.'Dorin, L. R. 7 H. 1. 568 (to "our
children ;" not applied to two illegitimate children by a person married
to the testatorjust before the making of the will, there being no children
after the marriage; the legal meaning held, in defiance of common sense,
to apply and to exclude those children) ; Re Fish, 1894, 2 Ch. 83 (to a
" niece E. W. ; " there was no such niece, but there wan a legitimate and
an illegitimate grandniece of the wife, each named E, W. ; facts showing
the applicability of the terms to the latter were excluded); American
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and deeds, the standard of usage is changed, i. e., it is the joint
sense of the parties that it is to be sou'ght;' but if it can be
clearly discovered, in the shape of usage or express agreement, there is on principle no objection to it merely on the
score that it varies, however widely, from the natural or
common or legal sense of the terms. Such is the attitude of
But here also we find manor rulings adopting
many courts.
the principle that a clear meaning cannot be overturned, by
any express understanding or special usage3
§ I3. Same: (3) Rule Against Correctinga FalseDesbn)ption.
A doctrine has obtained some footing in the United States
that where a description does not apply exactly to any object,
but applies partly to one or partly to another, no data at all
Bible Soc'y v. Pratt, 9 All. o9 (. Dedham Bank;" there was such a
bank, but also a Dedham Institution for Savings; facts showing the
applicability of the term to the latter were excluded) ; Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Society, 7 Met z88 (to "the Seaman's Aid Society in the city
of Boston;" there were two societies, one named as above, the other
named the Seaman's Friend Society ; the bequest given to the former,
by the present rule) ; Flora v. Anderson, U. S. App., 67 Fed. 182.
12 Ante, 9, p. 438.
Mitchell v. Henry, L. R1.15 Ch.D. x8r (stated supra, p. 684 ; James,
L. J., said: "The question is not whether the selvage is white, but
whether it is what the trade know as a white selvage"); Cochran v.
Retberg, 3 Esp. 12r (vessel to pay "five guineas a day demurrage;
custom not to reckon Sundays and holidays, held to prevail) ; Com. v.
Hobbs, z4o Mass. 443 (" white arsenic," in fact colored with lamp-black,
"still remained the substance known as white arsenic ") ; Farnum v.
R. Co., 66 N. H. 569 (" noiseless steam motor ;" technical application
to motors making some noise, allowed); Read v. Tacoma Assoc., 2 Wash.
198 (deed running a line "west;" custom to run such lines a little north
of west, admitted).
3 Balfour v. Fresno C. & 1.Co., io9 Cal. 221 ; Harrison v. Tate, zoo Ga.
383; Armstrong v. Granite Co., IM., 42 N. . 186; Allen v. Kingsbury,
z6 Pick. 238 (" evidence of usage is never to be received to overturn the
words of a deed);" Brackett v. Bartholomew, 6 Met. 396 ; Goode v.
Riley, 153 Mass. 585 (" You cannot prove a mere private convention
between the parties to give language a different meaning from its
common one. It woald open too great risks if evidence were admissible
to show that when they said 5oo feet they agreed it should mean zoo
inches, or that Bunker Hill Monument should signify the old South
Church ;" as to this, the sufficient answer is that the real significance of'
a large proportion of commercial cipher telegrams could then never be
proved).
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can be considered to interpret and apply the description to an
object which would be sufficiently and correctly described if a
part of the terms of the writing were omitted. This result
seems to have been reached in part by the influence of the
supposed rule (just explained) against disturbing a clear
meaning, and in part by the influence of the Baconian phrases
about ambiguities, i. e., it is argued in such ruling that there is
no ambiguity in such a case, and then it is assumed (forgetting
that the excludi g rule-ante,§ I i-to which there is an exception for ambiguities or equivocations, affects merely declarations of intention) that, not merely declarations of intention,
but all circumstances whatever, helping to interpret the
description, are to be excluded.' There is no support on
principle, or in orthodox precedent, for such a result; the
process is merely that of applying or interpreting a description, and of perceiving, upon the comparis6n of the terms with
an external object, that one or more terms are non-essential
and superfluous, and that the remainder are vital and decisive
indices of description. Thus, if a will gives property to
"'James Winchendon, native of Portland, Maine, husband of
my daughter Sarah, carpenter by trade, and residing at No.
48 West Street, Jamesville." and we find a person who fulfils
all these terms except that he lives at No. 348 West Place, we
may treat that term of the description as non-essential, and
still be satisfied that a person fulfilling the other and essential
terms is the one signified. This process, as including an
examination of all the circumstances, a rejection of part of the
description as superfluous, and an application of the remainder
to an object fulfilling it, is correct on principle, whether it is as
simple as in the above instance or more extensive and radical;
the only question can be whether in a given instance the cirI This attitude is seen in the dissenting opinion in Patch v. White, r17
U. S. 210, cited fost, where, after much reference to ambiguities, it is
finally said: "If there is any proposition settled in the law of wills, it is
that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show the intention of the
testator, unless it be to explain a latent ambiguity ;" here the real rule
referred to is the rule excluding declarations of intention ; and this unfortunate confusion of declarations of intention with all "extrinsic
evidence" whatever is frequently found as the source of erroneous rulings.
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cumstances sufficiently convince us that a certain part of the
description may be rejected as non-essential and superfluous.
This result has long been established in England. In the
United States no difficulty seems to have been experienced in
cases other than wills of land containing erroneous descriptions. In deeds of land it seems to be generally accepted
(according to the maxim,falsa demonstratio non nocet) that the
process of ascertaining what terms (e. g., courses and calls)
may be rejected as non-essential, and of considering the circumstances for that purpose, is a proper one; the only limitation being that enough must remain to indicate the land with
certainty. 2 Where a will is involved, a distinction may conceivably, though perhaps not properly, be taken between a will
devising "all my land, to wit," followed by the description in

question, and a will not so premising ownership; in the former
case, if the description names "the S. E. Y4 of the N. E. Y
of sect. 36, t. I8, r. io," and the testator owns no such land,

but owns the S. W. Y4 of the N. E. Y, then the whole description may be interpreted to read, omitting the first term as
non-essential, "1my land in the N. E. 4," etc., which is easily
applied; in the latter case, there being no such preliminary
term in the will, the description, omitting the first part, would
ICo. Litt. 3 a: "If lands be given to Robert, Earl of Pembroke, where
his name is Henry, . . . in these and like cases there can be but one of
that dignity or name, and therefore such a grant is good, albeit the name
of baptism is mistaken ;" Goodtitle v. Southern, I M. & S. 299 (" all my
farm, lands, and hereditaments called T. farm, .. . now in the occupation of A. C.;" though two closes of T. farm were occupied by M., the
whole was held to pass); Doe v. Huthwaite, 3 B. & Ald. 632 (to "G.
H., eldest son ofJ. H., etc., in default, etc., to S. H., second son ofJ. H.,
etc., in default, etc., to J. H., third son of J. H. ;" in fact, S. H. was
third son and J. H. second son; circumstances considered to show which
part of the description was essential) ; Cowen v. Truefitt, [x893] 2 Ch.
551 (deed of rooms on second floor of Nos. 13 and z4, Old Bond Street,
with frce ingress "through the staircase and passage ofNo. 13 ;" there
was a staircase and passage in No. 14, but none in No. 13; the words
"of No. 13" rejected asfalsa demonstratio).
2 See examples in Fancher v. DeMontegre, i Head, 40; Higdon v. Rice,
z 9 N. C. 623 ; Davidson v. Shuler, ib. 582, and cases cited; New York
L. I. Co. v. Aitkin, 125 N. Y. 66r; Gordon v.Kitrell (Miss.), 21 So. 922;
Rushton v. Hallett (Utah), 30 Pac. io04.
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run, "the N. E. Y of sect. 36," etc., which could not be enforced, because the testator does not own the whole N.E. Y.
Thus we have a further distinction between rulings which
regard it possible to imply such a term as "my land," where
it is wanting, and rulings which regard such an implication as
improper.2 Of the general state of the rulings it may be said'
(I) that the process of ascertaining the non-essential terms, by
considering all the circumstances and by applying the description with the omission of the non-essential terms, is in
the United States almost everywhere treated (as it is in England) as proper; (2) that where it is necessary,. in order to
obtain a sufficient description, to imply into the will such a
term as "land belonging to me," there are varying rulings
IThe controversy has centered around the case of Kurtz v. Hibner,
55 111. 514; criticised by Judge Redfield, of Vermont, in ro Axnu. LAW
IEG. N. S. 93, and defended by Judge Caton, of Illinois, ib. 353, and by
Julius Rosenthal, Fsq., of Chicago, in Chicago Legal News, March 18,
1871. In that case, the devise wPs of "the west half of the southwest
quarter of section 32, township $5, range io, containing eighty acres;"
it was offered to show, among other circumstancest that the testator
owned only one So-acre tract in township 35, but in section 33, and that
33
by the draughtsman's mistake "32 " had been written instead of " ;"
and a similar showing was offered as to another bequest. The second
part of this evidence (as to mistake) was rightly rejected, but the court
excluded the first part also, and it is from this latter point of view that
the ruling is to be questioned and has been the subject ofcontroversy.
The court laid stress on the fact that there were no other words in the will
by which the description could be applied to section 3.
2 The answer to the above suggestions seems to be that it is not necessary to imply any terms at all into the will; that the inquiry is merely
what object the description asa whole signifies in the light of the circumstances; and that the circumstance of the testator's owning e. g. onequarter section and not owning another may suffice to indicate that the
description taken as a whole was applied to the former, even though it is
not literally accurate in common usage. If there were a bequest to
"James Ryder," and the testator's usage applied this name to Joseph
Ryder, of Jamestown, it would be useless to argue that, by striking out
the incorrect "James," the remaining "Ryder" could not be applied to
that particular Ryder named Joseph because that would mean implying
into thewill; and yet the two
the word "Joseph" or "Jamestown"
arguments seem to rest on the same footing.
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(in the few instances where the question has been raised),
1
even by courts of the same jurisdiction.
John H. Wignore.
1

The question seems to have arisen chiefly in Illinois, Indiana, an&
Iowa, but in none of these jurisdictions, particularly in Illinois, are
the successive rulings consistent: Donehow v. Johnson, Iz3 Ala. 126 ;
Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 I. 514; Bowen v. Allen, 43 id. 53; Bishop
V.Morgan, 82 id. 35r (the dissenting opinion of Dickey, J., is valuable); Rmmert v. Hayes, 89 id. x6; Decker v. Decker, 121 id. 341
(practically overruling Kurtz v. Hibner); Bingel v. Volz, x42 id. 214
(following Kurtz v. Hibner); Hallady v. Hess, 147 id. 588; Cleveland v.
Spillman, 25 Ind. 95; Judy v. Gilbert, 77 id. 96; Funk v. Davis, 112 id.
281 ; Sturgis v. Work, 122 id. 134; Rook v. Wilson, 142 id. 24; Hartwig
v. Schiefer, 147 id. 64; Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Ia. 674; Christy v.
Badger, 72 id. 581; Covert v. Sebern, 73 id. 564; Eckford v. Eckford,
id., 53 N. W. 344; Wilson v. Stevens (Kan.), 51 Pac. go3; Riggs v.
Myers, 20 Mo. 239; Gordon v. Burris, 141 id. 6o2; Winkley v. Kaime,
32 N. H. 268 (useful case); Jackson v. Sill, ixJohns. 2oi; Scates v.

Henderson, 44S.C. 548; Minor v. Powers (Te=.), 24 S. W. 71o; Patch
v. White, 117 U. S. 210; Wildberger v. Cheek, 94Va.517; Ross v. Kiger,
42 W. V. 402.
From the above cases should be distinguished those in which a real
equivocation exists, e.g. where a deed or will names "the S. B. M of the
N. W. X of sect. xo," but does not name range or township, county or
atate; here the description is equally and correctly applicable to several
pieces of land, and the case is analogous to a bequest to "John Smith; '
in such cases, even declarations of intention would be admissible (ante,
Sii) ; and it is clear that at least the circumstances may be looked to in
apylying the equivocal description; see instances: Hallady v. Hess, 147
III. 588; Ill.
Cent. R. Co. v.LeBlanc, 74 Miss. 65o ; Ladnier v. Ladnier
id., 23 So. 43o ; and cases cited therein.

